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Over the past decade, the long-term trends of consoli-
dation and innovation in the U.S. banking system
have intensiﬁed. Today a large proportion of assets
held by U.S. banking organizations is concentrated
in a small number of companies, and U.S. banking
organizations have integrated into their product mix
activities that extend well beyond traditional deposit-
taking and lending. As a result of these develop-
ments, there is a small number of banking organiza-
tions that are larger and engage in a wider array of
ﬁnancial activities than at any time in recent history.
Banking supervisors have responded to these
changes by adapting their approaches to supervision
so that they continue to be aligned with the way ﬁnan-
cial organizations structure and manage their business
activities. These newer approaches—collectively
referred to as risk-focused supervision—are designed
to focus the greatest amount of supervisory attention
on the business areas that represent the greatest risk
to a banking organization’s overall condition.
The Federal Reserve began to implement a struc-
tured, more formal program of risk-focused super-
vision in the early 1990s, and that program continues
to evolve as the banking system itself continues to
change. Since the mid-1990s, the Federal Reserve
has devoted particular attention to developing and
implementing a program for the supervision of the
largest, most complex banking organizations, or
LCBOs. Given the speed with which the risk proﬁles
of these institutions can change, the LCBO super-
vision program incorporates both a more continuous
supervision process than in the past and a greater
emphasis on the evaluation of banking organizations’
internal systems and controls for managing risk.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM FOR LCBOS
Trends in the Banking Industry
Since 1989, the U.S. banking industry has undergone
both consolidation in assets and expansion in the
range of ﬁnancial activities conducted, an extension
of long-term trends. From 1989 to 1999, the number
of independent banking organizations in the United
States fell from 9,500 to 6,800.1 Over the same
period, total assets held by these banking organiza-
tions rose nearly 50 percent in real terms (chart 1). A
related trend is that the banking system’s assets have
become even more concentrated than before in the
largest banking organizations. Speciﬁcally, the share
of total assets held by the ﬁfty largest U.S. banking
organizations rose from 55 percent in 1989 to 74 per-
cent in 1999; the share held by the ten largest grew
from 26 percent to 49 percent (chart 2).
Expansion in the range of ﬁnancial activities of
U.S. banking organizations is reﬂected in an increase
both in the notional amount of derivatives contracts
and in the size of nonbank subsidiaries. A small
number of institutions are responsible for the largest
portion of derivatives activity of U.S. banking organi-
1. Included are all bank holding companies and all independent
banks (with no holding company). Notably, most of the consolidation
in the banking system has occurred as the result of mergers and
acquisitions, but bank failures at the beginning of the period also
played a role. For more detail, see Stephen A. Rhoades, Bank
Mergers and Banking Structure in the United States, 1980–98, Staff
Studies 174 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
August 2000).
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1. Includes all bank holding companies and independent banks with no
holding company.
2. Adjusted by the GDP deﬂator (base year = 1996).zations, with the ten largest institutions accounting
for nearly 95 percent of the total notional amount.
Growth in the assets of nonbank subsidiaries of U.S.
banking organizations over the past decade reﬂects
in large part a signiﬁcant expansion in the securities
activities of the largest organizations. Total assets of
nonbank subsidiaries held by the largest ﬁfty banking
organizations now represent nearly a quarter of their
total consolidated assets, and the largest ten compa-
nies account for the greatest proportion of these non-
bank assets.2
Many factors account for the increase in asset
concentration at the largest U.S. banking organiza-
tions as well as the broadening of the range of their
ﬁnancial activities during the 1990s. These factors
include increased competition in ﬁnancial markets,
improvements in information technology, the lifting
of restrictions on interstate branching, some easing
of regulatory restrictions on securities activities, the
globalization of economic activity, and an effort by
banking organizations to diversify revenue sources
to mitigate cyclical effects on core banking activities,
such as lending and deposit-taking.3
These trends are expected to continue, particularly
given recent changes in U.S. banking law. During the
six decades before 1999, U.S. banking organizations
were subject to the provisions of the Banking Act of
1933, commonly referred to as the Glass–Steagall
Act, which prohibited U.S. banks from being afﬁli-
ated with ﬁrms engaged principally in corporate secu-
rities underwriting and dealing. Thus, the banking
business and the securities business were effectively
separated. Starting in the mid-1980s, this separation
began to diminish as some U.S. bank holding com-
panies established securities subsidiaries, subject to
revenue and other limits to prevent violation of the
Glass–Steagall Act.4 U.S. banking organizations,
however, were still generally prohibited from engag-
ing in insurance underwriting activities. The Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 eliminated the separation
of ﬁnancial activities, allowing U.S. banking organi-
zations with well-capitalized and well-managed bank
subsidiaries to engage in both securities and insur-
ance underwriting activities through separate subsidi-
aries. Banking organizations are now allowed to own
securities and insurance companies and vice versa.
Supervisory Responses
Supervisory programs for state member banks and
bank holding companies are implemented by indi-
vidual Reserve Banks under policies and procedures
issued by the Federal Reserve Board.5 Historically,
the Reserve Banks generally used local supervisory
staff for examinations and inspections, which, for the
most part, were focused on legal entities, such as
banks, Edge corporations, or bank holding compa-
nies. The examinations and inspections were con-
ducted once a year in most cases, and, subsequently,
a rating was issued for the entity examined. There
was usually little supervisory activity focused on the
examined entity during the remainder of the year
unless a crisis arose or the examination revealed
material problems that required continued attention
by supervisors. Ratings were arrived at using an
approach that placed a great deal of emphasis on the
valuation of assets, particularly the loan portfolio,
while also taking into consideration assessments of
other factors, including capital, earnings, liquidity,
and management.
2. For a few of the ﬁfty largest companies, data on total nonbank-
ing assets were not available.
3. For a useful survey on this topic, see Allen N. Berger, Rebecca S.
Demsetz, and Philip E. Strahan, ‘‘The Consolidation of the Financial
Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the
Future,’’ Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 23 (February 1999),
pp. 135–94.
4. For example, these so-called section 20 securities subsidiaries
(referring to section 20 of the Glass–Steagall Act) were allowed to
have only a certain percentage of their revenue stem from securi-
ties activities normally not allowed in a commercial bank—‘‘bank-
ineligible’’ activities—and were also limited outright from conducting
other activities.
5. The type of charter that a U.S. bank holds determines its primary
supervisor. For nationally chartered banks, the primary supervisor is
the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency; for state-chartered
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, it is the
Federal Reserve and the respective state; and for state-chartered banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve, it is the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the respective state. The Federal Reserve
also supervises bank holding companies and Edge corporations.
2. Share of total banking assets held by the ﬁfty largest
U.S. banking organizations, selected years, 1989–99
Ten largest










48 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 2001Changes in the environment in which banking
organizations operate have had a very substantial
impact on the way they are managed and, in turn,
have necessitated changes in the way they are super-
vised. It became clear that the traditional process
of examining banking organizations once a year—
focusing mostly on their stock of assets at a ﬁxed
point—would no longer be an effective way to
evaluate the condition of many banking organiza-
tions. The Federal Reserve responded to this situation
in the 1990s by developing a program of risk-focused
supervision. Various aspects of risk-focused super-
vision have been communicated in a series of letters
on policy guidance starting in 1995 (see box ‘‘Key
Milestones in Risk-Focused Supervision’’). The
LCBO supervision program, which was formally
established in 1999, is essentially an intensive appli-
cation of risk-focused supervision to the largest, most
complex banking organizations. These are the institu-
tions in which change is most dramatic, with respect
both to the impact of change and the speed with
which changes in the organizations’ risk proﬁles can
Key Milestones in Risk-Focused Supervision
As with most large-scale supervisory efforts, the develop-
ment of risk-focused supervision and of the LCBO program
has progressed in stages. The formal elements of the pro-
gram’s policy development include a number of supervision
and regulation (SR) letters, published by the Division of
Banking Supervision and Regulation at the Federal Reserve
Board. In general, these SR letters provide a way for the
Board to communicate supervisory policies to its supervi-
sory personnel, to the banking industry, to other market
participants, and to the general public.1 The SR letters
related to risk-focused supervision and the LCBO program
include the following.
• SR 95-22: Enhanced Framework for Supervising the
U.S. Operations of Foreign Banking Organizations. Details
a risk-focused supervision program developed by the bank-
ing supervisory authorities that have supervisory and exami-
nation responsibilities for the U.S. operations of foreign
banking organizations.
• SR 95-51: Rating the Adequacy of Risk Management
Processes and Internal Controls at State Member Banks
and Bank Holding Companies. Instructs examiners to shift
more of their focus to risk-management processes and inter-
nal controls in recognition that new technologies, product
innovation, and the size and speed of ﬁnancial transactions
have changed the nature of ﬁnancial markets.
• SR 96-14: Risk-Focused Safety and Soundness Exami-
nations and Inspections. Outlines the elements of risk-
focused examinations and inspections, which focus particu-
lar attention on the most important risks facing an institution
and evaluate lower-risk businesses less intensively.
• SR 97-24: Risk-Focused Framework for Supervision of
Large Complex Institutions. Describes the framework of a
risk-focused supervision program for institutions with more
than $1 billion in assets. The details of the framework,
including examination and inspection procedures, are con-
tained in an attachment, ‘‘Framework for the Risk-Focused
Supervision of Large Complex Organizations.’’
1. The SR letters are available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
srletters. The ﬁrst two digits of each letter indicate the year of issuance, the
second, the sequence of its issuance that year.
• SR 98-13: Enhancements to the Interagency Program
for Supervising the U.S. Operations of Foreign Banking
Organizations. Describes improvements to the interagency
risk-focused supervision program for the U.S. operations of
foreign banking organizations.
• SR 98-25: Sound Credit Risk Management and the Use
of Internal Credit Risk Ratings at Large Banking Organi-
zations. Guides supervisors in their evaluation of credit-
risk-management systems and offers examples of sound
practices.
• SR 99-15: Risk-Focused Supervision of Large Complex
Banking Organizations. Applies the risk-focused super-
vision framework to LCBOs and emphasizes the challenges
inherent in evaluating their internal control and risk-
management systems.
• SR 99-18: Assessing Capital Adequacy in Relation to
Risk at Large Complex Banking Organizations and Others
with Complex Risk Proﬁles. Directs supervisors to evaluate
banking organizations’ internal capital management pro-
cesses to determine whether they meaningfully tie the iden-
tiﬁcation, monitoring, and evaluation of risk to the determi-
nation of the institutions’ capital needs.2
• SR 00-13: Framework for Financial Holding Company
Supervision. Provides guidance concerning the purpose and
scope of the Federal Reserve’s supervision of ﬁnancial
holding companies, with particular emphasis on working
with other relevant supervisors and regulators.
• SR 00-14: Enhancements to the Interagency Program
for Supervising the U.S. Operations of Foreign Banking
Organizations. Discusses additional steps that are being
taken to further reﬁne the interagency risk-focused super-
vision program for the U.S. operations of foreign banking
organizations.
The LCBO program continues to develop and to be
reﬁned in response to changes in the industry. Senior man-
agement within the Federal Reserve System meet regularly
to review the LCBO program and to strengthen it, where
possible.
2. For more detail, see text note 11.
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Program’’). Generally, by paying special attention
to LCBOs, supervisors aim to minimize signiﬁcant
adverse effects on the public, on ﬁnancial markets
and the ﬁnancial system in the United States and
abroad, and on taxpayers, who provide the ultimate
resources behind the bank safety net.
Overview of the LCBO Program
The fundamental goals of the Federal Reserve’s
supervisory process for LCBOs are to maintain an
accurate and current assessment of each banking
organization’s ﬁnancial and managerial strength and
to respond in a timely fashion to any emerging prob-
lem. There are a number of important elements that
together deﬁne this program (see box ‘‘Comparison
of Traditional Bank Examinations with Risk-Focused
Supervision for LCBOs’’):
• The program places strong emphasis on
understanding and evaluating each institution’s
internal risk-management processes and control
infrastructures.
• Each LCBO is assigned a team of Federal
Reserve supervisors, who conduct an ongoing super-
visory program based on the risks that have been
identiﬁed in the organization’s operations.
• Small teams with technical expertise on such
issues as credit-risk modeling, payment systems, and
information technology are available to supplement
individual LCBO teams.
• The Federal Reserve’s assessment of the banking
organization’s risk proﬁle, as well as the correspond-
ing plan for supervision of the institution, is updated
quarterly, or more frequently as warranted, taking
into account market developments
• The program stresses the development of rela-
tionships with the management of the banking organi-
zation at various levels through regular and frequent
communications.
• The banking organizations that are covered by
the LCBO program are viewed not just individually
but also as a group to identify common or emerging
weaknesses that have the potential to become more
serious or to become systemic problems.
Regardless of how their business lines are man-
aged, most LCBOs operate through a variety of legal
entities that fall under the jurisdiction of different
licensing and supervisory authorities, requiring a high
level of information sharing and coordination among
relevant supervisory agencies. For example, because
a number of U.S.-headquartered LCBOs have lead
banks with national bank charters, the Federal
Reserve and the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the supervisor for national banks, cooper-
ate closely in the supervision of these banking
organizations. This collaboration among super-
visory agencies both facilitates understanding the
risk proﬁle of a banking organization as a whole and
Criteria for Inclusion in the LCBO Program
A number of measures are employed as guidelines for
determining whether a particular banking organization
should be included in the LCBO supervision program.
These measures take into account the size of the organi-
zation, the extent of international operations, participa-
tion in large-value payment and settlement systems, and
the extent of custody operations, ﬁduciary activities, and
trading activities. For foreign organizations with a signiﬁ-
cant U.S. presence, these measures are assessed for U.S.
operations as well as for the global organization. Mea-
sures that are considered include the following:
• Total assets
• Size of off-balance-sheet exposures
• Activity in derivatives markets
• Trading assets and trading revenue
• Foreign assets and foreign deposits
• Funding from market (non-deposit) sources
• Securities borrowed and securities lent
• Income from ﬁduciary activity
• Mutual fund sales and mutual fund fee income
• Revenue earned in mortgage markets
• Assets under management
• Activity in payment systems
• Involvement in securities settlements
• Geographic scope of operations
• Merchant banking activities and proprietary
investments
No single factor qualiﬁes or disqualiﬁes an organiza-
tion from being considered an LCBO. It is also important
to note that the population of LCBOs is ﬂuid and can
change as a result of developments affecting a banking
organization or changes in the industry as a whole. In
particular, the number of LCBOs can change rather
quickly as a result of mergers and acquisitions. Since
the establishment of the LCBO program, the number of
institutions that are considered LCBOs has been in the
range of twenty-ﬁve to thirty companies. In addition,
there are a number of banking organizations that do not
meet enough of the criteria to be considered LCBOs but
have sufﬁcient size or complexity in some of their activi-
ties to be covered by the program to a certain extent.




The basic framework for risk-focused supervision—
the program that the Federal Reserve applies to
all complex banking organizations with more than
$1 billion in assets (discussed in SR 97-24)—consists
of four principal activities that are carried out in a
continuous cycle.6 These are (1) gaining an under-
standing of the institution through a detailed risk
assessment; (2) developing the supervisory plan;
(3) executing the supervisory plan and reporting the
results; and (4) determining and communicating the
overall condition of the banking organization and
addressing supervisory concerns.
Formulating the Risk Assessment
The process of understanding an institution and
assessing its risks combines a ‘‘bottom-up’’ analy-
sis of signiﬁcant business lines—including reviews
of sampled individual credits, exposures, and
transactions—with a ‘‘top-down’’ look at the broad
policies, procedures, and controls with which the
banking organization identiﬁes and manages risks
company-wide. Using both approaches, examiners
evaluate six major types of risk—credit, market,
liquidity, operational, legal, and reputational (see box
‘‘Major Risk Categories’’). For signiﬁcant business
lines, examiners prepare an activity risk matrix by
evaluating the inherent risk undertaken by the busi-
ness line with respect to the six major risk categories
and then evaluating whether that risk is low, mod-
erate, or high. They then assess the strength of the
organization’s systems for managing those risks,
evaluating them as strong, acceptable, or weak. Risk-
management systems include oversight by the board
of directors and senior management; policies, pro-
cedures, and limits; internal risk review and man-
agement information systems; and internal control
processes.
The institution-wide risk assessment is also pre-
pared along the lines of the six major types of risk
and includes a composite risk assessment. Examiners
judge the level of each risk—high, moderate, or
low—and the direction of risk—increasing, stable, or
decreasing. In arriving at these assessments, examin-
ers incorporate their evaluations of corporate-wide
processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring, and
controlling the six major types of risk, as well as their
assessments of the risk proﬁles of signiﬁcant business
lines.
Developing the Supervisory Plan
The completion of the institution-wide risk assess-
ment leads to the development of a comprehensive
6. The Federal Reserve has also developed a program for risk-
focused supervision of community banks. That program is discussed
in SR 97-25.
Comparison of Traditional Bank Examinations with Risk-Focused Supervision for LCBOs
Traditional Bank Examinations Risk-Focused Supervision for LCBOs
Supervisory process is focused on a single point in time
and is rarely continuous unless there is a crisis.
Examinations are generally staffed locally.
Signiﬁcant emphasis is placed on valuation of assets.
Dialogue with management is mostly related to
examination ﬁndings unless there is a crisis.
Supervisory process is continuous and is more tuned
to market developments.
Institutions are assigned designated supervisory teams.
The teams are supplemented with specialists, who may
be drawn from across the Federal Reserve System.
Focus is on risk-management processes and control
systems.
There is more frequent communication with senior
management.
Supervisory process includes more interaction with line
management of business activities and risks.
Program includes business line and functional reviews
that incorporate identiﬁcation of best practices.
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supervisory plan outlines both the ongoing monitor-
ing and examination activities that are to be carried
out over the next twelve months and the resources
required for these activities. The activities that make
up the supervisory plan are a direct reﬂection of the
areas of signiﬁcant risk identiﬁed in the risk assess-
ment. The risk assessment is updated whenever sig-
niﬁcant new information is obtained, and the supervi-
sory plan, in turn, is updated to reﬂect any signiﬁcant
changes in an institution’s risk assessment.
The supervisory plan is developed in close coordi-
nation with other relevant supervisors and also takes
into account the ﬁndings of internal audits and inde-
pendent reviews. The coordination inherent in the
planning process is designed to utilize, to the extent
feasible, work done by others to avoid duplication
of effort and unnecessary regulatory burden on the
institution.
Executing the Supervisory Plan
Executing the supervisory plan entails a combination
of ongoing analysis and monitoring activities, pre-
examination analysis, and examination activity,
which generally includes some level of transaction
testing.7 Ongoing analysis and monitoring activities
may include the review of policies and procedures, of
internally generated management information reports
and regulatory ﬁlings, of audit ﬁndings, and of other
documents. Given the wide range in size and com-
plexity of the institutions covered under the basic
risk-focused framework, examination work can vary
from an annual examination that is focused on signiﬁ-
cant risk areas to a series of reviews targeted at
functional areas or business lines that are conducted
throughout the year. While carrying out their work,
examiners refer to supervisory manuals as well as
supplemental guidance. The results of these super-
visory assessment activities are detailed in various
written documents, including reports, letters to the
management of the institution, and, in some cases,
memoranda that discuss the ﬁndings of reviews con-
ducted at a number of institutions.
Determining and Communicating the Condition
of the Institution
The ﬁnal step in the ongoing process of basic risk-
focused supervision is making a judgment about the
overall condition of the banking organization, com-
municating that condition to the company’s manage-
ment, and addressing any supervisory concerns that
have been identiﬁed. An overall assessment of the
institution’s condition is prepared and sent to the
institution at least annually. Management is requested
to respond as to how it plans to address any areas of
supervisory concern that have been brought to its
attention in the assessment. Any necessary super-
visory measures for remedial action are also prepared
at this stage.
APPLICATION OF RISK-FOCUSED SUPERVISION
TO LCBOS
Increased Emphasis on Internal Systems and
Controls for Managing Risk
The size, complexity, and rapidly changing risk pro-
ﬁles of LCBOs make evaluation of their condition as
7. Transaction testing involves the review of individual transac-
tions, such as loans, derivatives contracts, or investments, to assess the
adequacy and consistency with which the institution’s policies and
procedures are applied.
Major Risk Categories
Credit risk arises from the potential that a borrower or
counterparty will fail to perform on an obligation.
Market risk is the risk to a ﬁnancial institution’s condi-
tion resulting from adverse movements in market rates or
prices, such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, or
equity prices.
Liquidity risk is the potential that an institution will be
unable to meet its obligations as they come due. It may
occur because an institution cannot liquidate assets or
obtain adequate funding (referred to as funding liquidity
risk) or because it cannot easily unwind or offset speciﬁc
exposures without signiﬁcantly lowering market prices
because of inadequate market depth or market disrup-
tions (referred to as market liquidity risk).
Operational risk arises from the potential that
inadequate information systems, operational problems,
breaches in internal controls, fraud, or unforeseen crises
will result in unexpected losses.
Legal risk arises from the potential that unenforceable
contracts, lawsuits, or adverse judgments will disrupt or
otherwise negatively affect the operations or condition of
a banking organization.
Reputational risk is the potential that negative public-
ity regarding an institution’s business practices, whether
true or not, will cause a decline in the customer base,
costly litigation, or revenue reductions.
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same time, less meaningful than for smaller, less
complex institutions. Therefore, for LCBOs, the
supervisory process places even greater emphasis
on evaluating the organizations’ own systems for
managing risk as well as on evaluating their internal
control processes.
Nevertheless, transaction testing remains an impor-
tant element in the assessment of these banking orga-
nizations’ risk-management systems. Examiners also
evaluate the sufﬁciency with which banking organi-
zations stress test their portfolios in the process of
managing risk.8 Over time, as supervisors become
satisﬁed with individual banking organizations’ sys-
tems for classifying and measuring risk, they are
expected to provide bank management with sugges-
tions for further improvements in the systems based
on industry-wide best practices, consistent with mini-
mum standards for safety and soundness.
The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) authorized
qualifying bank holding companies to operate as
ﬁnancial holding companies (FHCs) and to engage
in a diverse range of ﬁnancial activities. The Federal
Reserve now acts as ‘‘umbrella’’ supervisor for
FHCs. The approach used by the Federal Reserve
under the LCBO program is fully consistent with the
process prescribed by GLBA for supervising FHCs.9
Umbrella supervision under GLBA reﬂects the reality
that the risks associated with ﬁnancial activities
generally cut across legal entities and business
lines and that, in fact, most large and sophisticated
ﬁnancial services companies take a consolidated, or
organization-wide, approach to managing their risks.
The umbrella role requires the Federal Reserve to
understand FHC’s corporate-wide systems and con-
trols for managing risk and to keep primary bank
supervisors and other relevant supervisors advised of
any evolving problems in these areas that may affect
the entities they supervise and regulate.
Assignment of a Designated Team
One of the essential elements of the supervisory
program for LCBOs is the assignment of a full-time
team of Federal Reserve supervisors to each banking
organization. This designated team is responsible for
developing and maintaining the Federal Reserve’s
supervisory plan for the banking organization and for
coordinating all supervisory activity related to it. In
its effort to accomplish this goal, the team must
maintain a high level of knowledge about the banking
organization and its strategies, organizational struc-
ture, risk-management systems, and control policies.
Each designated team is headed by a very senior
examiner or Reserve Bank ofﬁcial—the ‘‘central
point of contact,’’ or CPC, for the institution. The
CPC serves as the Federal Reserve’s primary day-to-
day contact for a particular LCBO and coordinates
the development and execution of the supervisory
strategy for the institution.
The designated team generally comprises four to
ten seasoned examiners and analysts. Team members
typically have broad-based knowledge and experi-
ence in banking and skill sets that are particularly
relevant to the risk proﬁle and major activities of the
banking organization. The work of the designated
team is supplemented as necessary with specialists in
technical areas such as modeling credit risk and mar-
ket risk, payment systems, and information technol-
ogy. Stafﬁng for the designated team is directed by
the Reserve Bank that has responsibility for leading
the Federal Reserve’s supervisory program for the
banking organization. A team may include members
from more than one Reserve Bank, and specialists
may also be drawn from across the System.
Maintaining Information Flows
Complex banking organizations typically measure
and manage consolidated risk by individual cus-
tomer; by major line of business; by category of risk,
such as credit risk or market risk; by industry and
geographic sector; and within distinct legal entities.
The supervisory team for an LCBO looks at how the
institution measures, monitors, and controls risk in
each of these areas. The team is able to maintain its
ongoing understanding of these risks in part through
the establishment of regular information ﬂows from a
variety of sources. Included are internal management
information reports from the banking organization as
well as internal and external audit reports, regulatory
ﬁlings, publicly available information, and informa-
tion from other supervisors. Also included in the
process are regular discussions with the management
of the banking organization as well as discussions
with other supervisory authorities responsible for
that banking organization. With respect to internal
management information reports, some of the largest
banking organizations are increasingly providing
direct on-line access to this information for the super-
visory team.
8. For example, the banking organization might conduct stress tests
by revaluing portions of its portfolio based on a hypothetical increase
in interest rates or a hypothetical change in exchange rates.
9. SR 00-13 Framework for Financial Holding Company Super-
vision provides guidance concerning the purpose and scope of the
Federal Reserve’s supervision of FHCs.
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supervision process is supported by an appropriate
degree of veriﬁcation through examinations or tar-
geted reviews of speciﬁc business lines. Such activi-
ties include testing of processes, procedures, and
controls, as well as a degree of transaction testing and
analysis that reﬂects the level of risk in the area being
reviewed and whether concern exists about the insti-
tution’s ability to manage risk in that area. Targeted
reviews of business lines are generally conducted in
the following types of circumstances:
• When the supervisory team determines that a
business line has high inherent risk that is not well
controlled or when little information is available to
the team on the operational controls
• When the business line is new, has undergone
signiﬁcant expansion, or is signiﬁcant in terms of
revenue and capital contribution but has not been
reviewed for an extended period
• When the business line has experienced signiﬁ-
cant operational problems.
The objective of targeting business lines for review
is to assess the adequacy of controls on activities
undertaken in these business lines and to assess more
fully their risk to the corporation.
Coordinating with Other Supervisors
Before the development of risk-focused supervision,
the style of communication among supervisors on
matters pertaining to an individual institution prima-
rily involved ad hoc contact. Such contact included
exchange of examination reports, sharing of informa-
tion related to speciﬁc problem situations, and coordi-
nation when special examination work was necessary
to obtain additional information regarding a problem
situation. The supervisors involved in this traditional
pattern of communication included the Ofﬁce of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Ofﬁce of Thrift
Supervision, state banking agencies, and foreign bank
supervisors.
Several authorities are usually involved in super-
vising various parts of the operations of LCBOs, both
within the United States and abroad. As these bank-
ing organizations have evolved, ongoing contact
among the supervisors of the principal afﬁliates
within a banking organization has become particu-
larly important. This contact is necessary not only to
avoid duplicative work by supervisors and excessive
burden on the institution but also to provide the
respective parties with the beneﬁt of the perspective
of their counterparts.
Coordinating with Other Primary Supervisors
This need for the exchange of information is particu-
larly important when the lead bank of an LCBO has a
primary supervisor other than the Federal Reserve.
The lead bank typically plays an integral role within
these dynamic banking organizations. In addition,
systemic risk is associated with the potential dis-
ruption of the operations of large banks. Thus, the
Federal Reserve needs to know more about the activi-
ties within large insured depository institutions than
can be derived from public information or from the
reports of the primary bank supervisor, and it also
needs to have more than ad hoc contact with the
primary bank supervisor. Similarly, the primary bank
supervisor needs information about the activities of a
bank’s parent company and its nonbank afﬁliates to
be aware of, and address as necessary, threats to the
soundness of the bank that may arise from elsewhere
in the consolidated organization.
As noted earlier, the Federal Reserve cooperates
routinely with primary bank supervisors in preparing
supervisory plans for LCBOs. The Federal Reserve
takes into account work that has been done by the
primary supervisor in identifying those areas that it
wants to focus on at a banking organization. In addi-
tion, there are times when examiners from both the
Federal Reserve and the primary bank supervisor
participate in an examination. For example, examin-
ers from both the Federal Reserve and the OCC may
participate in a review of an organization’s internal
audit process. Such an examination is normally under
the lead of one of the agencies, and, ordinarily, only
one report or memorandum is prepared.
Coordinating with Functional Regulators
Because many LCBOs have become ﬁnancial hold-
ing companies, they are in a position to expand
further the range of activities they engage in through
nonbank subsidiaries. Therefore, functional regula-
tors have been added to the mix of regulatory coun-
terparts with which effective communication and
cooperation needs to take place. Functional regula-
tors include the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission,
the National Association of Securities Dealers, and
constituents from the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners. In its role as the umbrella
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eral Reserve must coordinate its activities with these
functional regulators and work with them to under-
stand the risk proﬁles of the individual regulated
entities and their relation and importance to an FHC’s
overall risk proﬁle.
Coordinating with Foreign Supervisors
In the international sphere, the Federal Reserve has
been working with its counterparts in various coun-
tries around the world to strengthen communication
and cooperation in the supervision of banking organi-
zations that operate across borders. These efforts at
collaboration have intensiﬁed in recent years and
now take place in a variety of international settings,
as well as on a bilateral basis between supervisors
with respect to individual banking organizations (see
box ‘‘Special Aspects of Supervising Large Foreign
Banking Organizations’’). One example of a multilat-
eral effort is the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision, in which supervisors from member countries
meet to discuss important issues and formulate guide-
lines to improve and reﬁne the process of banking
supervision globally.
Portfolio Approach
Evaluating activities of banking organizations across
institutions to identify trends and ensure consistency
in supervisory treatment has long been a practice
among supervisors.10 The LCBO program builds
upon this practice by emphasizing comparative
analysis of LCBOs with similar business lines, char-
acteristics, and risk proﬁles. This portfolio approach
to supervision serves to identify ‘‘outliers’’ among
LCBOs with respect to risk proﬁles and risk-
management techniques. By using this approach,
supervisors are able not only to continue ensuring
10. An example is the Shared National Credit program, in which
the bank supervisory agencies review large syndicated loans (more
than $20 million) annually to provide an efﬁcient and consistent
review and classiﬁcation of any loan or loan commitment shared by
three or more supervised institutions.
Special Aspects of Supervising Large Foreign Banking Organizations
Foreign banking organizations (FBOs) have a sizable pres-
ence in the United States, accounting for about 20 percent
of the assets held by banking organizations located or
operating in the United States.1 Some of the largest FBOs
are also among the largest participants in U.S. ﬁnancial
markets. Because of their size and complexity both on a
global level and in terms of their U.S. operations, large
FBOs account for approximately one-third of the banking
organizations in the LCBO program.
U.S. bank supervisory agencies operate as ‘‘host coun-
try’’ supervisors for FBOs. As a result, although they have
full access to information concerning the U.S. operations
of FBOs, they do not have the same level of access to
information on FBOs’ consolidated operations and risk-
management systems as the home country supervisors do.
Therefore, U.S. supervisors focus particular attention on
evaluating an FBO’s consolidated ﬁnancial condition, its
capital adequacy, and its general ability to support its U.S.
operations. In this regard, U.S. supervisors apply several
speciﬁc criteria to assess an FBO’s ability to support its
U.S. operations, including measures related to ﬁnancial and
managerial soundness, to corporate governance, and to
transparency.2
1. Total assets held by foreign banking organizations include total assets
of U.S. bank holding companies or ﬁnancial holding companies held by those
foreign institutions, as well as total assets of branches, agencies, Edge
corporations, direct nonbank subsidiaries, and commercial lending compa-
nies held by them.
2. The Federal Reserve, along with other banking agencies, has in place a
program for the coordinated supervision of FBOs, which outlines how
For FBOs that are part of the LCBO supervision pro-
gram, the program’s risk assessments are prepared speci-
ﬁcally for the U.S. operations. However, U.S. supervisors
need to have a sufﬁcient understanding of an FBO’s global
risk-management and internal control systems in order to
evaluate the manner in which those systems are applied
with respect to oversight and control of its U.S. operations.
U.S. supervisors are often able to obtain much of this
information from FBO management based in the United
States. However, in many cases the centralized nature of
banking organizations’ management of certain business
lines or control functions may necessitate discussions with
corporate management at the FBO’s headquarters.
A core element of the LCBO program as applied to FBOs
is communication with home country supervisors. In peri-
odic meetings and discussions, U.S. supervisors seek the
views of the home country supervisors on developments
in the home country ﬁnancial system generally and with
respect to individual FBOs. U.S. and home country super-
visors share information, as appropriate, contained in risk
assessments and supervisory plans and obtained in examina-
tions of U.S. operations of FBOs. When follow-up super-
visory action is necessary, U.S. and home country super-
visors work together closely in the development and
implementation of the supervisory action.
these measures should be evaluated. See SR 00-14 Enhancements to the
Interagency Program for Supervising the U.S. Operations of Foreign Bank-
ing Organizations (available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters).
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similar businesses and risk proﬁles but also to com-
pare risk-management practices within the industry.
In a broader sense, supervisors are given an improved
framework for discerning industry trends, which can
be particularly useful in informing policymakers.
In the development of the LCBO program, there
have been a number of structured efforts to improve
portfolio analysis of LCBOs. Two of the most impor-
tant have been Coordinated Supervisory Exercises
(CSEs) and the establishment of competency centers
and knowledge centers. Through CSEs, supervisors
develop comparative analyses of risk-management
processes governing speciﬁc business activities or
functional areas, deepen their understanding of inher-
ent risk in speciﬁc business activities, develop exam-
iner expertise, and identify gaps or weaknesses in
existing Federal Reserve System policies and pro-
cedures. For each CSE, a team is formed that typi-
cally has members from several Reserve Banks as
well as staff from the Federal Reserve Board. CSEs
can take various forms but usually involve examina-
tion work at a number of LCBOs, which are selected
based on their involvement in the business activity
or control function being reviewed. Once the project
is completed, participants in a CSE prepare a report
on the results and ﬁndings and distribute it within the
community of relevant supervisors. In addition, the
aggregate ﬁndings are discussed with the banking
organizations that were included in the CSE.
The establishment of competency centers and
knowledge centers, which are housed at designated
Reserve Banks, arose out of a need to develop and
maintain Federal Reserve System expertise in spe-
ciﬁc technical areas in an efﬁcient manner. At this
time, competency centers have been established for
two areas—venture capital activities and capital man-
agement processes.11 One knowledge center has been
established with respect to insurance activities. These
centers assist examiners and other supervisory staff in
keeping abreast of the most recent developments in
their respective areas. In addition, competency cen-
ters maintain teams of specialists in their respective
areas that are available to participate in examinations
in other Federal Reserve Districts.
Market Discipline
The idea that ﬁnancial markets can provide useful
discipline to U.S. banking organizations is not new.
However, as non-core funding—that is, funding
based on uninsured deposits—now represents a
higher percentage of total funding than in the past,
particularly for LCBOs, it is important that market
participants play a greater role in the supervision of
these banking organizations. The need for market
discipline—and its prerequisite, public disclosure—is
heightened because the unusual size and complexity
of LCBOs requires either more burdensome and
detailed supervision and regulation or incentives from
other sources to ensure safe and sound banking opera-
tions. Discipline of LCBOs and other banking organi-
zations by the market can complement supervision
by reducing excessive risk-taking, by alleviating
some of the moral hazard that exists with a federal
safety net, and, it is hoped, by decreasing the level of
supervision that would otherwise be necessary.12
Market discipline works through changes in access
to funds and changes in risk premiums as banks take
on or shed risk or engage in certain types of trans-
actions. Market discipline can function directly, for
example, if the cost of funding for a banking organi-
zation rises as its risk-taking increases; or indirectly,
as market participants and bank supervisors observe
prices of the company’s ﬁnancial instruments (includ-
ing equity shares and various types of debt) to assess
whether the risk proﬁle has increased and then take
appropriate action. Two particular approaches to mar-
ket discipline appear to be most promising, particu-
larly for LCBOs: increased public disclosure and
issuance of subordinated debt by the companies.13
More transparent balance sheets and the disclosure
of additional information about a banking organiza-
tion’s risks are beneﬁcial to shareholders, debt hold-
ers, and the market in general. Expanding this type of
disclosure is one strategy for improving market disci-
pline. To be sure, most LCBOs already disclose a
considerable volume of information to market partici-
pants, and, indeed, there is ample evidence that mar-
ket discipline now plays a role in affecting their
behavior. Nonetheless, the scale and clarity of disclo-
11. These processes include sophisticated techniques used to model
the speciﬁc amount of capital necessary to support certain activities—
often referred to as ‘‘economic’’ capital.
12. The term ‘‘moral hazard’’ applies to instances in which an
economic agent’s risk-taking is affected by the fact that the agent
faces zero or reduced costs from a negative outcome of a risky action
but receives full gains from a positive one. For example, if creditors of
a banking organization know that deposit insurance will protect them
from losses if it fails, then they have few incentives to protect against
a deterioration in its ﬁnancial condition.
13. In 1999, a Federal Reserve task force sponsored the publication
of staff studies on these two subjects: Federal Reserve System Study
Group on Disclosure, Improving Public Disclosure in Banking, Staff
Studies 173 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
March 2000); and Federal Reserve System Study Group on Subordi-
nated Notes and Debentures, Using Subordinated Debt as an Instru-
ment of Market Discipline, Staff Studies 172 (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, December 1999).
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on average, could be considerably improved.
One particularly useful element of increased public
disclosure is the reduced tendency for market partici-
pants to be surprised by sudden adverse news. If
information is released on a more consistent basis,
the reporting of unfavorable news is less likely to
result in large market movements, which might have
systemic implications. Supervisors are engaged in a
dialogue with the banking industry to identify those
areas in which expanded public disclosure would be
most useful. In that regard, a private-sector working
group recently issued recommendations for more fre-
quent public disclosure of ﬁnancial information by
banking and securities organizations. Among its rec-
ommendations, the group said that market risk infor-
mation previously disclosed annually should be dis-
closed quarterly; that the content of market risk
disclosures should be improved; and, that additional
credit risk information on wholesale credit exposures
should be made available quarterly. The group also
noted that public disclosures should vary among insti-
tutions to reﬂect legitimate differences in internal
management processes and that disclosure practices
should change in step with innovations in ﬁrms’
risk-management and measurement practices.14
The second strategy that may hold considerable
promise for augmenting market discipline is to
require banks to issue minimum amounts of subordi-
nated debt to unrelated parties. Subordinated debt
holders have an interest in discouraging excessive
risk-taking because their claims are both long-term
and junior to all depositors and to any senior debt
holders. Subordinated debt holders share in very lim-
ited ways in potential gains made by a company but
are exposed to considerable risk if it encounters
ﬁnancial difﬁculty. In this respect, their risk prefer-
ences can resemble those of banking supervisors. By
raising a company’s cost of funds, subordinated debt
holders can send a direct signal that excessive risk-
taking is not desired. However, as documented in a
recent report to the Congress by the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve Board, a number of uncertainties
need to be clariﬁed before a mandatory subordinated
debt policy would be judged desirable.15 These uncer-
tainties include how best to interpret changes in debt
spreads, whether changes in other regulatory policies,
such as improvements in risk-based capital rules, will
make mandatory subordinated debt unnecessary, and
whether the bank or its holding company parent
should issue the debt.
BENEFITS OF THE LCBO SUPERVISION
PROGRAM
To date, there have been some recognizable beneﬁts
from the implementation of the LCBO program. First,
supervisors are able to maintain on a more consistent
basis a deeper understanding of the risk proﬁles,
ﬁnancial performance, and relative strength of the
banking organizations in the program. Information
exchanges—both with banking organizations and
with other supervisors—are more frequent and open
at all levels than in the past. As a result of ongoing
monitoring and coordination efforts, the Federal
Reserve becomes aware more quickly of emerging
problems and is able to work with banking organiza-
tions and other supervisors, as appropriate, to take
whatever steps may be necessary to address these
issues. Having a more complete and continuous ﬂow
of information also helps supervisors to gauge earlier
the effect of potentially adverse events on banking
organizations and on the ﬁnancial system in general.
An additional beneﬁt of the program is the perspec-
tive that has been gained on risk-management prac-
tices across the industry. This perspective enables
supervisors to provide recommendations to banking
organizations with respect to strengthening of risk-
management processes. These recommendations are
based on a greater understanding of industry-wide
best practices, consistent with minimum standards for
safety and soundness, than was generally available to
supervisors in the past.
14. The Working Group on Public Disclosure, established in April
2000 by the Federal Reserve Board, was composed of representatives
of eleven banking and securities ﬁrms. The working group’s recom-
mendations were announced in a joint press release by the Federal
Reserve Board, the OCC, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, dated January 11, 2001, that is available on the Board’s
web site at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/2001.
15. Under GLBA, the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board
were required to prepare a report to the Congress on the feasibility and
desirability of a mandatory subordinated debt policy for certain
depository institutions and their holding companies. This report, The
Feasibility and Desirability of Mandatory Subordinated Debt,w a s
submitted to the Congress in December 2000 and is available on the
Board’s web site at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/.
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